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  1847 
SHOULD YOUTUBE’S CONTENT ID BE 
LIABLE FOR MISREPRESENTATION 
UNDER THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
COPYRIGHT ACT? 
Abstract: YouTube has quickly become the dominant player in the Internet vid-
eo sharing platform market. To keep its leading position, it created an internal au-
tomated system to police potential copyright infringements known as Content ID. 
Generally, that system functions similarly to third-party computer automated sys-
tems that send takedown requests, yet it is exempt from liability for removing 
lawful videos under a safe harbor provided by the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998 (“DMCA”). Although some industry experts first championed Con-
tent ID, many now question whether it unfairly favors copyright holders and 
YouTube itself at the expense of content creators and the greater Internet com-
munity. This Note asserts that a Content ID match is equivalent to a formal 
takedown notice under the DMCA, and that Content ID should thus have to con-
sider fair use prior to issuing a Content ID match. This Note then argues that the 
DMCA’s safe harbor provisions should be amended to require websites utilizing 
internal automated systems to consider fair use. 
INTRODUCTION 
YouTube has rapidly changed the way people express themselves and in-
teract with each other on the Internet.1 Over 400 hours of video are uploaded 
to YouTube every minute from people all around the world, documenting mo-
mentous events and daily life.2 Those videos help distribute news, showcase 
new artistic content, and provide countless hours of entertainment.3 Yet, hun-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Benjamin Boroughf, The Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, 
Cooperation, and Fair Compensation, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 95, 101 (2015) (discussing YouTube’s 
prominent role in society as a place of empowerment, creativity, publication and everyday conversa-
tion); Amul Kalia, Congrats on the 10-Year Anniversary YouTube, Now Please Fix Content ID, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 1, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/congrats-10-
year-anniversary-youtube-now-please-fix-content-id [https://perma.cc/Q7P6-LXU3] (recognizing that 
YouTube is pioneering the development of speech and entertainment on the Internet). 
 2 See Fred von Lohmann, A Step Toward Protecting Fair Use on YouTube, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y 
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2015), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2015/11/a-step-toward-protecting-fair-
use-on.html [https://perma.cc/ZA96-RDTQ] (discussing the importance of protecting fair use on 
YouTube); How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797
370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/CF8S-5KBS] (explaining how Content ID works). 
3 About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ [https://perma.cc/2RSU-
XLQR] (explaining that YouTube is a platform that allows billions of people around the world to 
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dreds of thousands of those videos are removed from the Internet by automatic 
computer algorithm systems that flag them as alleged copyright infringe-
ments.4 Although some of those claims are meritorious, many are not.5 As 
YouTube’s own computer algorithm system, Content ID, gains more users, a 
new level of speech censorship that exists wholly outside the law or judicial 
review threatens the Internet community.6 
YouTube’s Content ID is an internal computer algorithm system that al-
lows copyright holders and content creators to detect possibly infringing vide-
os.7 As more copyright holders and content creators begin to utilize Content 
ID, more videos are removed from the Internet for alleged copyright viola-
tions.8 YouTube contends that Content ID qualifies for the safe harbor provi-
sion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), which 
shields it from liability, but some industry experts believe that YouTube should 
be required to do more to benefit from the safe harbor.9 In addition, many be-
lieve that unless YouTube responds to the market’s criticism of Content ID it 
may face an exodus of its content creators.10 
                                                                                                                           
communicate with each other in new and innovative ways); see von Lohmann, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing the variety of content uploaded onto YouTube). 
 4 See Daniel Seng, The State of Discordant Union: An American Analysis of DMCA Takedown 
Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 386 n.54 (2014) (explaining how the takedown procedures lend 
themselves to fraudulent abuse).  
 5 See Parker Higgins & Kurt Opshal, Copyright’s Robot Wars Heat Up as Algorithms Block Live-
Streams First and Ask Questions Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., (Sept. 7, 2012), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/copyrights-robot-wars-heat-algorithms-block-live-streams-first-and-
ask-questions [https://perma.cc/T98Q-F9GX] (discussing computer algorithm systems’ susceptibility 
to false detections of infringement). 
 6 See Laura Leister, YouTube and the Law: A Suppression of Creative Freedom in the 21st  Cen-
tury, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 109, 109 (2011) (noting that modern copyright law is in a state of 
disorder because of YouTube’s success and desire to escape liability, the lack of legislative regulation, 
a YouTube uploader’s fear of infringement, and the power of wealthy copyright holders); Boroughf, 
supra note 1, at 97 (discussing how Content ID’s structure has a potential to chill speech and take 
advantage of the creativity and work of content creators who upload videos to YouTube). 
 7 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. Content ID identifies videos that are possibly infringing 
and may then block the video if directed to do so by the copyright holder. Id. 
 8 See generally Seng, supra note 4, at 377 (discussing the rapid and substantial increase in the 
issuance of takedown notices). For example, in 2014, Google received and analyzed thousands of 
takedown notices each month. See id.  
 9 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright Takedown Regime by Taking Misrep-
resentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 749 (2011) (noting that copyright law 
requires little from online service providers, like YouTube, in order to benefit from the safe harbors). 
 10 See Seng, supra note 4, at 429 (noting that content creators often switch service providers when 
receiving a formal takedown notice); Allegra Frank, YouTube Is Changing the Content ID System in 
an Effort to Help Creators, POLYGON (Apr. 28, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2016/4/28/
11531228/youtube-content-id-changes-copyright-dispute-jim-sterling [https://perma.cc/K239-6P4M] 
(describing changes YouTube will make to aid the frustrating experience of using Content ID); Patri-
cia Hernandez, YouTube’s Content ID System Gets One Much-Needed Fix, KOTAKU (Apr. 28, 2016, 
1:48 PM), http://kotaku.com/youtubes-content-id-system-gets-one-much-needed-fix-1773643254 
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Based on the large volume of videos that Content ID improperly blocks or 
removes, and the shift from the notice and takedown procedures to host-
provided filtering, Congress should amend the DMCA to reflect the current 
Internet market.11 This Note argues that YouTube’s Content ID should be re-
quired to consider fair use prior to issuing a Content ID match, the effective 
equivalent of a takedown notice.12 It also argues that if YouTube fails to con-
sider fair use before issuing a Content ID match, it should lose its safe harbor 
status under the DMCA in order to protect the YouTube community from the 
removal of important and lawful content.13 Part I reviews the applicable provi-
sions of the DMCA, YouTube’s Content ID structure, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 holding in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 
the leading case analyzing the toll of fair use.14 Part II discusses the unex-
pected consequences of Content ID and the impact of Lenz on computer algo-
rithm systems’ liability for misrepresentation under the DMCA.15 Part III ar-
gues that Congress should require internal computer algorithm systems that po-
lice infringing content, like Content ID, to consider fair use prior to removing 
material and to hold YouTube liable under misrepresentation if it fails to do so.16 
I. PIRATING THE INTERNET: AUTOMATED TAKEDOWN REQUESTS 
With YouTube’s rise in popularity, there is an increasing need to balance 
user autonomy and free speech with protection of copyright holders and online 
service providers.17 This Part examines how the DMCA and computer algo-
rithm systems, specifically YouTube’s Content ID, help police copyright in-
fringement, and how the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lenz might impact their 
future.18 Section A explains the DMCA’s takedown procedures and misrepre-
sentation provision, as well as the doctrine of fair use.19 Section B provides a 
background on computer algorithm systems and explores how YouTube Con-
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/CR6C-F7Y2] (describing the process of utilizing Content ID as “giving users huge 
headaches”). 
 11 See Boroughf, supra note 1, at 103 (noting the pros of host-provided filtering as online service 
providers can more rapidly and cheaply identify infringing content than copyright holders, and cons as 
the system exists whole outside the law and with no human oversight). 
 12 See infra notes 148–198 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 148–198 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 17–119 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 120–147 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 148–198 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for User-
Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 937 (2009) (noting the value that YouTube and 
copyright law add to society). 
 18 See infra notes 22–119 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 22–67 and accompanying text. 
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tent ID works.20 Finally, Section C discusses the facts and holding of Lenz, the 
takedown procedures, and the misrepresentation provision of the DMCA.21 
A. The DMCA: Friend or Foe? 
The DMCA was enacted to balance copyright holders’ demands for polic-
ing copyright infringement, online service providers’ demands for protection 
from liability for hosting infringement, and content creators’ demands for protec-
tion against liability for distributing lawful content.22 To advance those goals, the 
DMCA created takedown procedures granting copyright holders a swift way to 
combat infringement, safe harbors protecting online service providers from lia-
bility if they comply with those procedures, and legal redress for content creators 
whose material was improperly removed.23 The DMCA is based on the premise 
that copyright holders have the knowledge to determine infringing uses, service 
providers have the means to take down those infringing uses, and content crea-
tors will file suit against those who abuse the takedown procedures.24  
1. What About the Copyright Holders? How the DMCA’s Takedown 
Procedures Benefit Copyright Holders 
The DMCA offers copyright holders the speedy elimination of infringing 
material if they comply with the takedown notice regime.25 Once a takedown 
notice is filed, copyright holders can obtain removal of alleged infringing ma-
terial without having to file a federal copyright claim or having a court weigh 
in on the validity of its infringement claim.26 Due to the regime’s effective and 
quick removal of material, however, many copyright holders abuse the proce-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 68–97 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 98–119 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Adam Eakman, The Future of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: How Automation and 
Crowdsourcing Can Protect Fair Use, 48 IND. L. REV. 631, 632 (2015) (noting that the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) attempted to strike a balance between the rights of copy-
right holders and the rights of those that upload to the Internet). 
 23 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (f) (2012) (listing the 
takedown procedures, the safe harbor requirements, and the misrepresentation provision). 
 24 See id. § 512(c), (f)–(g); Eakman, supra note 22, at 637–38 (noting that the DMCA places the 
burden on copyright holders to police copyright infringement in exchange for “expeditious elimina-
tion” of infringing material, and hence “favor[ing] speed over accuracy” (alteration in original)). 
 25 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (listing the takedown procedures); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, 
Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 636 (2006) (explaining 
the DMCA takedown procedures). 
 26 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); Urban & Quilter, supra note 25, at 636 (noting that under the DMCA, 
alleged infringing material can be removed before a court conducts any sort of analysis). 
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dures by blocking negative treatment of their work or obtaining greater protec-
tion for their work than copyright allows.27 
To help combat the abuse of the takedown procedures, the DMCA re-
quires copyright holders to have a good faith belief that the alleged infringing 
material is not authorized before issuing a takedown notice.28 If the copyright 
holder correctly initiates a takedown request, the Internet service provider 
(“ISP”), for example YouTube, must then block or remove the content, as well 
as provide the party that posted the content, generally known as content crea-
tors, with a takedown notice.29 
Another check against the abuse of takedown notices is a content crea-
tor’s option to file a counter notice if they believe they have improperly re-
ceived a takedown notice.30 Once an ISP receives a counter notice, it must 
provide the original party who filed the takedown request with a copy of the 
counter notice.31 The proper filing of a counter notice could lead to an alleged 
infringer’s material being re-uploaded.32 
 If a counter notice is never filed, the material may be removed perma-
nently.33 In fact, few counter notices are filed, despite their role as necessary 
checks on the takedown notice regime.34 One reason may be that content crea-
tors are asked to disclose information that could open them up to liability be-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Loren, supra note 9, at 749 (discussing how copyright holders abuse the takedown proce-
dures by filing false takedown notices); Mike Masnick, DMCA’s Notice and Takedown Procedures Is 
a Total Mess and It’s Mainly Because of Bogus Automated Takedowns, TECHDIRT (Mar. 30, 2016, 
11:40 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160330/01583234053/dmcas-notice-takedown-
procedure-is-total-mess-mainly-because-bogus-automated-takedowns.shtml [https://perma.cc/V9DH-
VKUV] (noting that automated takedown notices do not consider fair use thus rendering them fraudu-
lent in many cases); Takedown Hall of Shame, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.
org/takedowns [https://perma.cc/NR5Y-CUTK] (posting some of the most ridiculous and fraudulent 
takedown requests). 
 28 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (listing the requirements of a takedown notice). 
 29 See id. (stating that the complaining party must have a good faith belief that the material “is not 
authorized by the copyright holder, its agent, or the law”); see also Eakman, supra note 22, at 637 
(explaining the DMCA’s notice and takedown procedures). An Internet service provider (“ISP”) like 
YouTube is incentivized to comply with the takedown process because doing so protects it from lia-
bility under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (explaining how an ISP 
can receive safe harbor); see also infra notes 37–55 and accompanying text (explaining how ISPs 
escape liability under the DMCA). 
 30 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (detailing the requirements for a counter notice); see also Loren, 
supra note 9, at 758 (analyzing the counter notice’s role in protecting lawful activity from abusive 
takedown notices). 
 31 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B) (detailing how ISPs can limit their liability). 
 32 See id. § 512(g)(2)(B)–(C). 
 33 Id. § 512(g); see also Eakman, supra note 22, at 637 (explaining the process of a counter no-
tice). 
 34 See Loren, supra note 9, at 760 (discussing why many content creators do not send a counter 
notice). 
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fore filing a counter notice.35 Another reason may be that content creators are 
simply unaware of the opportunity to file a counter notice or do not understand 
all of the requirements.36 
2. But You’re Hosting It? How YouTube and Others Escape Copyright 
Liability Under the DMCA’s Safe Harbor Provisions 
The DMCA outlines four safe harbors that shield certain websites from li-
ability for engaging with potentially infringing material.37 For websites to ben-
efit from a safe harbor, they must meet several conditions.38 Congress created 
the safe harbors to encourage websites to cooperate with the copyright industry 
by policing infringing material while still permitting them to engage in techno-
logical innovation.39 Congress therefore recognized that websites were incapa-
ble of monitoring all of the material on their sites, and thus the DMCA places 
the burden of policing potential copyright infringement on the copyright hold-
ers themselves.40 As a result, websites like YouTube only need to cooperate 
when necessary to benefit from the safe harbor.41 
To qualify for safe harbor protections, the website must first qualify as an 
ISP.42 If a website qualifies as an ISP, it must then meet an array of other re-
quirements depending on the type of service it provides.43 For a website like 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (listing the contents of a counter notice). Section 512(g)(3) requires, 
among other things, for content creators to disclose their name, address, telephone number, and a 
statement expressing consent to jurisdiction. See id. 
 36 See Loren, supra note 9, at 760 (suggesting that content creators may not file counter notices 
because they require legal expertise). 
 37 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d); see also Eakman, supra note 22, at 636 (discussing the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provisions). Section 512(a) creates a safe harbor for transitory digital network communications, 
§ 512(b) creates a safe harbor for system caching, § 512(c) creates a safe harbor for information resid-
ing on systems or networks at the direction of users, and § 512(d) creates a safe harbor for information 
location tools. 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 38 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (listing the conditions that service providers must meet to obtain a safe 
harbor). 
 39 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (noting that without proper protection, online service 
providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of 
the Internet); H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1988) (Conf. Rep.); Kevin C. Horman, The Death of the 
DMCA? How Viacom v. YouTube May Define the Future of Digital Content, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1345, 
1350 (2009) (explaining how the DMCA was established to create the legal platform for a robust 
Internet community). 
 40 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (describing the requirements for an official DMCA takedown no-
tice); Horman, supra note 39, at 1352 (explaining how the DMCA makes the copyright holder respon-
sible for detecting infringement). 
 41 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); Horman, supra note 39, at 1350 (explaining how service providers 
obtain a safe harbor). 
 42 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). The DMCA defines an ISP as “an entity offering the transmission, 
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the mate-
rial as sent or received.” Id. 
 43 See id. § 512(a)–(d). 
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YouTube to qualify for a safe harbor, and thus escape liability, it must meet the 
conditions under § 512(c).44 Those conditions include not having actual 
knowledge that the material it hosts is infringing, as well as not being aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.45 If YouTube 
were to obtain knowledge of infringing material, it must act quickly to remove 
or disable access to the material.46 In addition, YouTube must have a designat-
ed agent to receive takedown notices and must not receive any direct financial 
benefits from infringing material that it can reasonably control.47 
If YouTube does receive a formal takedown notice, thereby obtaining 
knowledge of potential infringing material, it must engage in the DMCA’s 
takedown procedures to continue benefiting from safe harbor protection.48 If 
YouTube fails to adequately comply with the takedown procedures, it loses its 
safe harbor protection and thus exposes itself to potential liability.49 First, 
YouTube must expeditiously remove or disable access to the alleged infringing 
material.50 After taking down the alleged infringing material, it must notify the 
content creator that its video has received a takedown notice.51 The content 
creator may then choose to file a counter notification disputing the alleged in-
fringement.52 
If a counter notification is filed, YouTube has eleven to thirteen days to 
notify the copyright holder that it will replace the removed material or stop 
disabling access to it in, unless it receives notice that the copyright holder has 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. § 512(c). Section 512(c) outlines the conditions placed on information residing on sys-
tems or networks at direction of users. See id. 
 45 See id. § 512(c)(1)(A). 
 46 See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that ISPs must act “expeditiously to remove, or disable ac-
cess to, the material”). 
 47 See id. § 512(c)(1)(B) (stating that an ISP must not receive direct financial benefits from in-
fringing material that it “has the right and ability” to control). In April 2013, in Viacom International 
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on remand held 
that YouTube did not have the “right and ability to control” infringing content within the meaning of 
§ 512(c)(1)(B). See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom III), 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). In 2012, on appeal from the Southern District’s original holding in the Viacom liti-
gation, the Second Circuit held that the “right and ability to control” means “something more” than a 
service provider’s ability to control the content that appears on its website. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc. (Viacom II), 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2nd Cir. 2012). To constitute as “something more” and 
thus forfeit safe harbor protection, a service provider “must influence or participate in the infringe-
ment” rather than have knowledge of the infringing activity, or even welcome it. See Viacom III, 940 
F. Supp. 2d at 118. The court therefore rejected Viacom’s arguments that the “something more” in 
YouTube’s case was its ability to harbor infringement, its editorial judgment over its content as it was 
able to remove certain content, and its function to facilitate infringing searches. See id. at 120. 
 48 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). In addition, a copyright holder’s official written notification of claimed 
infringement, referred to as a takedown notice, must comply with the requirements under § 512(c)(3). 
See id. 
 49 See id. § 512(c). 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. § 512(c), (g). 
 52 See id. 
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filed a lawsuit in district court.53 In sum, if YouTube correctly engages in the 
takedown procedures it receives protection from the safe harbor.54 Although 
there are numerous requirements, they are fairly easy to meet considering that 
the benefit is insulation from liability.55 
3. What About Content Creators? The DMCA’s Misrepresentation 
Provision and the Fair Use Doctrine 
Although the takedown notice regime and the safe harbors offer vast pro-
tection to copyright holders and ISPs, Congress also offered content creators 
protection from takedown abuses by allowing them to file a federal claim for 
misrepresentation or to defend their work on fair use grounds.56 Even though a 
misrepresentation claim and a fair use claim are distinct features, they are 
closely linked.57 
Congress recognized that copyright holders and content creators could 
over-zealously file takedown requests and counter notifications, and thus pro-
vided a federal cause of action for such abuse.58 Entities that abuse the DMCA 
may be subject to liability under § 512(f), the misrepresentation provision.59 
Section 512(f) generally can be used to hold copyright holders and content 
creators liable for improperly engaging in the takedown notice and counter 
notice process.60 The provision was created to protect copyright holders, ISPs, 
and content creators from false infringement allegations that could destabilize 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See id. 
 54 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 55 See id. See generally Diane M. Barker, Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act: The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47, 57 
(2005) (explaining that the safe harbor provisions under the DMCA were designed to incentivize ISPs 
to comply with the requirements). 
 56 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (enumerating the requirements for a misrepresentation claim); Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing the four requirements used to determine whether a 
work is fair use). 
 57 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (listing the requirements for a misrepresentation claim, including “mate-
rially misrepresent[ing] . . . that material or activity is infringing” (alteration in original)); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (explaining when material or activity does not infringe on a copyright); see also Lenz v. Uni-
versal Music Corp. (Lenz III), 815 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a copyright holder is 
liable for misrepresentation if it fails to consider whether a work is fair use prior to issuing a takedown 
notice). 
 58 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f); Loren, supra note 9, at 761 (noting that the misrepresentation claim 
was created to deter the abuse of false takedown requests). 
 59 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f); see also Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1154 (analyzing the merits of a misrepre-
sentation claim). 
 60 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (stating that any individual can be held liable for misrepresenting that a 
material is infringing); see also Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (explaining that § 512(f)(1) applies to copy-
right holders and § 512(f)(2) applies to users). 
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the copyright regime, as well as to curtail the filing of takedown requests that 
could chill the creation and dissemination of knowledge.61 
When choosing to file a federal copyright infringement or a misrepresen-
tation claim, holders and content creators must determine whether the alleged 
infringing material constitutes fair use.62 Content creators that choose to file 
counter notices generally claim that their material is not infringing any copy-
right because it is fair use.63 Although Congress does not explicitly mention 
what constitutes fair use in the DMCA, the Copyright Act of 1976 states that 
the fair use of a copyrighted work is not a copyright infringement, and there-
fore is authorized by the law.64 
Fair use permits the unlicensed use of copyright-protected works in cer-
tain circumstances, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, or research.65 The Copyright Act outlines four factors to determine 
whether a work is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the na-
ture of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect on the 
copyrighted work.66 The fair use doctrine thus promotes copyright’s broader 
goal of disseminating public knowledge by recognizing that authors should not 
always have exclusive rights over the use of their works.67  
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Loren, supra note 9, at 761–62 (noting that false takedown requests are “detrimental to 
rights of holders, service providers, and Internet users”). According to Congress, the misrepresentation 
provision was intended to “deter knowingly false allegations to service providers in recognition that 
such misrepresentations are detrimental to rights of holders, service providers, and users.” S. REP. No. 
105-190, at 49 (1998). The over-filing of takedown requests could run afoul of Congress’s constitu-
tional mandate to “promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . 
the exclusive Right to their [work].” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (alteration in original); Loren, 
supra note 9, at 761–62. 
 62 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1148 (holding that § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires copyright holders to 
consider fair use prior to issuing takedown notice). 
 63 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors that must be considered in a fair use analy-
sis); see also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz I), 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(explaining that the plaintiff’s claim against Universal was grounded on the affirmative defense of fair 
use). 
 64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (establishing the factors to consider when determining whether a copyright 
work is fair use); Id. § 512 (establishing limitations to copyright liability for material online). 
 65 Id. § 107. 
 66 See id. (enumerating the four factors that must be considered in a fair use analysis). 
 67 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that copyright’s broader goal is to pro-
mote the progress of science and the arts). Although copyright law does incentivize authors to produce 
works by granting them exclusive rights over their productions, the fair use doctrine balances the 
rights of copyright holders and the interests of the public to further copyright’s constitutional purpose. 
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (explaining that from copyright’s 
inception, fair use has been necessary to fulfill copyright’s constitutional purpose of promoting the 
progress of science and the arts); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(explaining that copyright’s overall objective is to contribute to public knowledge).  
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B. Copyright Is No Longer Within Human Control: Even Lawful Videos 
Cannot Escape Computer Algorithm Systems 
As hundreds of millions of videos are uploaded to YouTube, the rights of 
copyright holders are increasingly at risk.68 For example, thousands of videos 
are uploaded to YouTube everyday either displaying a cover of a Taylor Swift 
song or playing the song in the background.69 The possibility or practicality of 
Taylor Swift’s legal team finding every infringing video is slim and onerous.70 
For owners of copyrighted works, computer algorithm systems that utilize an 
automated process to find possibly infringing videos are an efficient solution.71 
1. Let Computers Do It: The Emergence of Automated Takedown Requests 
on the Internet 
Computer algorithm systems that search the Internet for copyright in-
fringements enable copyright holders who hold thousands of copyrights to 
identify and rapidly remove infringing material.72 Some businesses choose to 
hire outside firms to do their policing, yet some websites that host third-party 
material employ an in-house automated process.73 Generally, the automated 
process includes searching keywords related to the copyrighted content.74 If 
alleged infringing material is identified, the system automatically sends a 
takedown notice to the host of the material, generally a website, in order to re-
move it from the Internet.75 If the host of the material is, for example, YouTube, 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Sean M. O’Connor, Creators, Innovators, and Appropriation Mechanisms, 22 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 973, 980, 987 (2015) (recognizing the innovation that occurs on YouTube, while noting 
that all creators need a platform where they can turn their ideas into reality). 
 69 See Sharon Lynn Pruitt, Taylor Swift Gets Couple’s Wedding Video Muted Over Copyright 
Claim, OXYGEN (Oct. 12, 2015, 3:19 PM), http://www.oxygen.com/very-real/taylor-swift-gets-
couples-wedding-video-muted-over-copyright-claim [https://perma.cc/WJ9T-L5K3] (discussing how 
YouTube muted a couple’s wedding video because a Taylor Swift song played in the background of 
the video). 
 70 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz II), 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.), amended by 815 
F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting the overwhelming amount of material copyright holders have to 
review when policing infringement). 
 71 See id. (describing how computer algorithm systems can help copyright holders efficiently 
detect possible infringement). 
 72 See Eakman, supra note 22, at 638 (noting that computer algorithm systems enable companies 
to utilize their human capital on more important matters than searching millions of videos for poten-
tially infringing material). 
 73 See id. (discussing how various companies issue automated takedown requests); How Content 
ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining YouTube’s in-house automated system for policing infringing 
content). 
 74 See Eakman, supra note 22, at 638 (explaining the process Microsoft’s third-party firm utilized 
when issuing takedown requests); How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how Content ID 
utilizes keywords and phrases to police possible infringing content). 
 75 See Eakman, supra note 22, at 639 (explaining how Google received a takedown notice from 
Microsoft to remove alleged infringing parts from Microsoft’s own website). 
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a copyright holder can have the video removed in minutes if YouTube’s own 
automated system detects it as possibly infringing.76 Thus, the entire process 
from which a lawful video may be removed from the Internet can escape hu-
man review.77 
2. YouTube Content ID for the Win: The Structure of YouTube Content ID 
For years, YouTube has faced litigation for hosting copyright infringing 
content.78 Although many believed that YouTube was exempt from liability 
under the statutory safe harbor provision, many also criticized YouTube for not 
monitoring its own website for infringing material.79 YouTube responded to 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. at 633 (discussing how Content ID first scans uploaded videos against its reference of 
keywords and phrases and sends a notice to the copyright holder if it detects possible infringement); 
How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how a copyright holder can have a video removed 
once it receives a possible infringement notice from Content ID). 
 77 See Eakman, supra note 22, at 639 (noting that the takedown process “had little human over-
sight and was prone to error”). If creators of the alleged infringing material wish to re-upload their 
video, there are further steps they could take. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (g)(3). If a person wishes to 
contest a takedown notice, they can issue a counter-notification to the host; for example, YouTube. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3). If the copyright holder wishes to pursue further action, they may file a 
lawsuit in court. See id. § 512(f). 
 78 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom I), 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). In 2007, Viacom filed a suit against YouTube for showing over 79,000 copyrighted videos. Id.; 
Jonathan Stempel, Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube Lawsuit, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2014, 
11:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/18/us-google-viacom-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H
11220140318#l6c42LbzoqIzPH7v.97 [https://perma.cc/8SXG-HFJZ] (discussing the seven-year set-
tlement litigation between Google and Viacom over Google’s alleged infringing posts on YouTube).  
 79 See, e.g., Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516; Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May 
Break: On the Secondary Liability of Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. IN-
TELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 143 (2010) (noting YouTube’s entitlement to the DMCA’s safe harbor provi-
sion); Kalia, supra note 1 (discussing how YouTube created Content ID to address concerns that it did 
not adequately police its own site); Pruitt, supra note 69 (criticizing YouTube for wrongly removing 
videos entitled to fair use). YouTube alleged that they were entitled to the safe harbor provision pro-
vided in § 512(c). See id. That provision states: 
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.— 
(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as 
provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of 
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a 
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service 
provider— 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material 
on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or dis-
able access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in 
a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; 
and 
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the criticism, acknowledging that its copyright holders needed help identifying 
pirated material, and that its content creators needed protection to continue 
creating lawful content that attracts consumers to its website.80 
In addition to meeting the interests of copyright holders and content crea-
tors, Content ID was also an innovative business strategy that allowed YouTube 
to partner with copyright holders in order to generate and share advertising reve-
nue.81 Content ID is YouTube’s in-house automated system that enables copy-
right holders to identify videos that include material they own.82 Copyright 
holders first give copies of audio and video files to YouTube, YouTube then 
converts those files into reference files, and then stores them on its own data-
base.83 As of November 2015, Content ID contained three million files.84 
Content ID monitors videos during the period when they are uploaded, 
but not yet published.85 When a video is uploaded, it is compared to the refer-
ence files on the database.86 Content ID compares the video to its reference 
files on audio grounds, video grounds, partial comparison, and even when one 
video’s quality is worse than another.87 If Content ID identifies a match, it 
sends a Content ID claim to the content creator.88 After sending a Content ID 
claim, YouTube executes the copyright holder’s demand to either mute the au-
dio that matches their music, block the entire video, make profits off of the 
video by running advertisements, or track the video’s views.89 Content ID can 
                                                                                                                           
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infring-
ing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 80 See Kalia, supra note 1 (noting that Content ID was created as a response to YouTube’s lack of 
policing); How Content ID Works, supra note 2. See generally Abigail R. Simon, Contracting in the 
Dark: Casting Light on the Shadows of Second Level Agreements, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 305, 
315 (2014) (discussing the development and nuances of Content ID). 
 81 See Simon, supra note 80, at 308 (discussing the various reasons YouTube created Content ID, 
including the development of a new stream of revenue). 
 82 How Content ID Works, supra note 2; see Simon, supra note 80, at 308 (describing how Con-
tent ID works). 
 83 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. YouTube only grants access to Content ID to certain 
copyright holders. Id. A holder must exclusively own the rights “to a substantial body of original 
material that is frequently uploaded by the YouTube user community.” Id. Additionally, YouTube 
retains the authority to revoke a holder’s access to Content ID if they repeatedly make erroneous 
claims. Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See How Content ID Works, supra note 2. Additionally, Content ID allows the copyright holder 
to take different actions in different countries, allowing a holder to block a video in China while mon-
etizing it in Italy. Id. 
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also perform a “legacy scan” to identify videos that match before the copyright 
holder signed onto Content ID.90 
If content creators choose to challenge a Content ID match, they have a 
difficult task ahead of them.91 Copyright holders have thirty days to determine 
whether the video that Content ID matched infringes on their copyright.92 If a 
copyright holder decides that it does, the content creator has the opportunity to 
accept the usage restrictions or to dispute the claim.93 If the content creator 
disputes the claim, the copyright holder then gets to decide whether to drop the 
claim or uphold it.94 If the copyright holder upholds the claim, the content cre-
ator can either accept the restrictions or appeal it.95 If the content creator 
chooses to appeal, the copyright holder can drop the claim or file a formal 
takedown request.96 Every content creator, however, may not be qualified to 
appeal.97 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. A complete legacy scan could take a couple of months. Id. 
 91 Id.; see Kalia, supra note 1 (explaining the Content ID process and noting that Content ID 
disenfranchises content creators). For example, a video that went viral, “Evolution of Dance,” could 
have received thirty-two Content ID matches. See Kalia, supra note 1. With such a high number of 
matches, it would have been practically impossible for the video’s creator to contest each claim. See 
id. Moreover, if the video’s creator had chosen such a path, the video might not have gone viral. See 
id. 
 92 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. 
 93 Id.; see also A Guide to YouTube Removals, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.
org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals [https://perma.cc/7SCS-KVJE] (explaining 
the process of Content ID matches and appeals). 
 94 A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 93; How Content ID Works, supra note 2. 
 95 A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 93; How Content ID Works, supra note 2.. 
 96 A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 93; How Content ID Works, supra note 2. The pro-
cess on how to file a formal takedown request is provided in § 512(c)(3)(A): 
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the own-
er of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multi-
ple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a rep-
resentative list of such works at that site. 
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and in-
formation reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. 
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the com-
plaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic 
mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. 
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the materi-
al in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or 
the law. 
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of 
perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an ex-
clusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
 97 See Kalia, supra note 1 (explaining that only content creators whose accounts are in good 
standing can appeal, and a maximum of three appeals are allowed at a given time per user). 
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C. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.: The Ninth Circuit Brings Fair Use to 
Improper Takedown Requests 
This section discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lenz.98 Lenz held that 
an entity must consider fair use before issuing a formal takedown request, but 
did not address what that consideration must entail.99  
1. Background on Lenz 
On February 8, 2007, Stephanie Lenz uploaded a twenty-nine second video 
to YouTube showcasing her young child dancing to the song, “Let’s Go Crazy” 
by the late-artist Prince.100 On June 4, 2007, Universal Music Corp. (“Univer-
sal”), the song’s copyright holder, sent YouTube a takedown notice request de-
manding that YouTube remove the video because it violated Universal’s copy-
right to the song.101 YouTube then e-mailed Lenz, notifying her that her video 
had been removed.102 On June 27, 2007, Lenz sent YouTube a counter notifica-
tion, asserting that her video constituted fair use and demanding that her video 
be re-uploaded.103 About six weeks later, YouTube re-uploaded the video.104 
In April 2008, Lenz filed her final amended complaint against Universal for 
alleged misrepresentation under § 512(f).105 Lenz claimed that Universal was 
                                                                                                                           
98 See infra notes 99–118 and accompanying text. 
 99 Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1135. 
 100 Lenz I, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52. 
 101 See id. at 1152. Universal’s review process before initiating a takedown request included evaluat-
ing whether the video “‘embodied a Prince composition’ by making ‘significant use of . . . the composi-
tion, specifically if the song was recognizable, was in a significant portion of the video or was the focus 
of the video.’” Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1129. Universal’s video evaluation guidelines, however, did not ex-
plicitly include consideration of the fair use doctrine. See id. 
 102 See Lenz I, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. YouTube’s e-mail also instructed Lenz of the DMCA’s 
counter notification process as well as the possibility of having her channel removed for multiple 
violations of copyright. See id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. at 1153. Section 512(f) provides: 
Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— 
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or 
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, 
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys” fees, incurred by the al-
leged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s authorized licensee, or by 
a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service 
provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the 
material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or 
ceasing to disable access to it. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(f). In July 2007, Lenz had filed her first complaint alleging misrepresentation and 
tortious interference with her contract with YouTube. See Lenz I, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. Lenz had 
also sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement. See id. Her final amended complaint only 
alleged a claim for misrepresentation under § 512(f). See id. On January 24, 2013, the district court 
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liable for misrepresentation because it knowingly failed to comply with the 
takedown procedures in § 512(c).106 Lenz asserted that Universal did not form a 
good faith belief that her video was “not authorized,” because it did not consider 
whether her video was fair use.107 
2. Considering Fair Use Before Issuing a Takedown Notice 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that an entity can be 
liable for misrepresentation under § 512(f) for improperly issuing a takedown 
notice, thus bringing unity to the takedown procedures in § 512(c) and the mis-
representation provision in § 512(f).108 The court then determined whether the 
DMCA’s takedown procedures required copyright holders to consider fair use—
an issue of first impression across all circuits in the nation.109  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that § 512(c) re-
quires an entity to consider fair use before issuing a takedown notice.110 In 
reaching its decision, the court reasoned that the Copyright Act “explains that the 
fair use of a copyrighted work is permissible because it is not an infringement of 
copyright.”111 The court thus rejected Universal’s argument that fair use is an 
                                                                                                                           
denied both Universal’s and Lenz’s motions for summary judgment and certified its order for inter-
locutory appeal. See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1150. On September 14, 2015, the Ninth Circuit filed its 
opinion and on March 17, 2016, it filed its amended opinion. See id. 
 106 See Lenz I, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. Specifically, § 512(c) requires a party to “ha[ve] a good 
faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright own-
er“ before issuing a takedown notice. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (alteration in original). 
 107 See Lenz I, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (describing how ISPs can 
escape liability even if hosting infringing material). 
 108 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (stating that an entity that abuses the DMCA, may be subject to 
liability under § 512(f)). Section 512(f) generally holds copyright holders and content creators liable 
for improperly engaging in the takedown notice and counter notice process. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
The importance of Lenz on the future of copyright and the DMCA is bolstered by the fact that Ninth 
Circuit issued the decision. See William K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 1, 42 (2006) (asserting that the Ninth Circuit is one of the most influential courts in the de-
velopment of copyright law). 
 109 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151. Section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires a takedown notification to 
include “statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the material in the 
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
 110 Compare Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding that § 512(c) “unambiguously contemplates fair 
use as a use authorized by the law”), with Tuteur v. Grosley-Concoran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 333, 343–44 
(D. Mass. 2013) (holding that §512(c) does not require an entity to consider fair use prior to initiating 
a takedown notice). 
 111 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1152. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides: “the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added). 
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affirmative defense and thus not “authorized by the law.”112 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that fair use is “authorized by law” because the Copyright Act created 
a non-infringing use, and therefore a copyright holder must consider the exist-
ence of fair use before sending a takedown notice.113 
 After concluding that an entity must consider fair use prior to issuing a 
takedown request, the court analyzed whether Universal knowingly misrepre-
sented that it had formed a good faith belief that the video did not constitute fair 
use.114 The court clarified that Universal only needed to show that it formed a 
subjective good faith belief that the video was not fair use.115 Thus, an entity is 
liable under § 512(f) if it: (1) ignores or neglects a consideration of fair use 
before sending a takedown notice, or (2) claims it formed a good faith belief 
that the video was not fair use when evidence shows otherwise.116 Lenz con-
tended that Universal was liable because it had not formed any belief regarding 
the video’s fair use.117 Universal, however, contended that its procedures were 
equivalent to a consideration of fair use, even though they were not labeled as 
such.118 Ultimately, the court denied both parties’ motions for cross summary 
judgment on the misrepresentation claim.119 
II. COMPUTER ALGORITHM SYSTEMS AND FAIR USE 
Although some first championed computer automated systems like Con-
tent ID, today they face significant criticism.120 This Part reviews how com-
puter algorithm systems have affected the Internet community and copyright 
law.121 Section A examines the unintended consequences of computer algo-
rithm systems and Content ID.122 Section B reviews how the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1152. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the notion that fair use is 
an affirmative defense, stating: “[fair use] as an affirmative defense that excuses conduct is a misno-
mer: . . . ‘it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976.’” Id. (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 113 Id. at 1151–52. 
 114 See id. at 1153. The court rejected the district court’s finding that Lenz may proceed under a 
willful blindness theory, instead asserting that Lenz may proceed under an actual knowledge theory. See 
id. The court explained that Lenz could not proceed under a willful blindness theory because it had 
failed to meet the first factor of the Global-Tech Test. See id. at 1155. According to the court, under 
that test, a plaintiff must establish two factors: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there 
is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learn-
ing of that fact.” See id. (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011)). 
 115 Id. at 1154–55. 
 116 See id. The court explained that it was “in no position to dispute the copyright holder’s belief 
even if [it] would have reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. at 1154 (alteration in original).  
 117 See id. 
 118 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1154. 
 119 See id. at 1158. 
 120 See, e.g., Kalia, supra note 1 (discussing examples of improper Content ID matches). 
 121 See infra notes 124–147 and accompanying text. 
 122 See infra notes 124–141 and accompanying text. 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 holding in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. 
affects computer algorithm systems.123 
A. Unexpected Consequences of Computer Algorithms and Content ID 
Although automated takedown notices help large companies police the In-
ternet for copyrighted material, they also ensnare many lawful uses of non-
infringing material.124 Those systems thereby test which values are at the heart 
of a business: efficiency or accuracy.125 The automated systems save huge 
businesses time and money in detecting and removing infringing material, but 
they frequently err in identifying that material.126 Moreover, a business may 
wind up paying for an improper mistake in court.127 
Yet although thousands of lawful videos are taken down each day for al-
leged copyright infringement, few lawsuits are initiated against the companies 
that issued improper takedowns.128 An impediment to holding companies lia-
ble for improper takedown notices is the lack of transparency regarding how 
exactly companies utilize computer algorithm systems to police the Internet for 
pirating material.129 Another issue is the lack of enforcement power courts 
have given to the misrepresentation provision.130 
Since its launch, Content ID has received significant negative attention 
because it has incorrectly matched thousands of lawful videos as infringing on 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. 
 124 Kalia, supra note 1. For example, the record label Total Wipes’ automated system attempted 
to protect a song called “Rock the Base & Bad Format” by targeting any site that had the words 
“rock” and “base” in it. Id. That meant targeting stories about “rock” climbing and a festival about 
“rock” music located on a military “base.” Id. 
 125 See Eakman, supra note 22, at 634 (discussing some of the short comings of automated sys-
tems). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012) (allowing those who 
have received a wrongful takedown request to bring suit in federal court). 
 128 See Loren, supra note 9, at 776–81 (discussing various issues as to why few misrepresentation 
claims are filed, despite the number of false takedown notices). 
 129 See Mike Masnick, Warner Bros. Has to Reveal the Process by Which It Sends Automated 
DMCA Takedowns, TECHDIRT (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:30 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140928/
06504828658/warner-bros-has-to-reveal-process-which-it-sends-automated-dmca-takedowns.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/AL8Y-HLH5] (discussing the lack of transparency regarding copyright policing 
methods and its effect on enforcing misrepresentation claims). Warner Bros. was sued for abusing the 
copyright takedown process. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 
6336286, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). To determine whether Warner Bros. improperly sent down 
takedown notices, the court ordered Warner Bros. to disclose its computer algorithm system. Id. at 
*48. 
 130 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (describing the requirements of a misrepresentation suit); Loren, supra 
note 9, at 776–79 (attributing the lack of misrepresentation claims to attorneys’ fees and the complexi-
ty of standing and personal jurisdiction).  
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a copyright.131 Many uses of copyrighted material are in fact completely legal, 
yet Content ID is unable to distinguish lawful use from unlawful use.132 Ac-
cordingly, lawful videos are removed or blocked without any human oversight 
if a copyright holder has contracted with YouTube to block or remove a video 
when a match is made.133 Given the fact that the process of disputing a Content 
ID match favors the copyright holder rather than the content creator, speech 
may go censored for weeks, even years.134 The effects of Content ID are thus 
similar to the effects of an official takedown request through the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), yet content creators are not al-
lowed to hold parties liable for misrepresenting a false or fraudulent Content 
ID match because it is not technically a takedown request.135 
In addition to censoring speech, Content ID allows copyright holders to 
abuse the system by permitting them to monetize off of videos, many of which 
are not infringing.136 Rather than choosing to block or remove a video, most 
copyright holders choose to monetize the video through advertisement reve-
nue.137  
In response to the criticism that Content ID—and other automated sys-
tems like it—sweep in too many innocent videos, YouTube rolled out a new 
program that offers more protection to its content creators.138 The program 
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Kalia, supra note 1 (discussing examples of improper Content ID matches). For example, 
Content ID improperly matched a person’s nature video because a media company, Rumblefish, 
claimed to own the soundtrack of singing birds. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed into a 
DMCA Takedown, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/
nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmca-takedown [https://perma.cc/DQ2P-3VVX]. 
 132 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Under § 107, the use of a copyrighted 
material is authorized when it is used “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” Id. 
 133 See How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how a copyright holder can choose to 
have a video blocked or removed if a match is made). 
 134 See Amul Kalia, Casualty of YouTube’s “Contractual Obligations”: User’s Free Speech, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/11/casualty-
youtubes-contractual-obligations-users-free-speech [https://perma.cc/2JKW-FXSV] (noting how Con-
tent ID’s “contractual obligations” create obstacles to the lawful dissemination of communication). 
 135 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (outlining the requirements of a takedown notice); Simon, supra 
note 80, at 323 (noting that Content ID exists outside of federal copyright law). 
 136 See Simon, supra note 80, at 316; What Is a Content ID Claim?, YOUTUBE HELP, https://
support.google.com/youtube/answer/6013276 [https://perma.cc/T9W6-ACKC] (explaining that copy-
right holders can choose to monetize off of a video by placing an advertisement over it). 
 137 See Simon, supra note 80, at 305 (noting that from 2008 to 2014, copyright holders chose to 
make profits on 90% of Content ID matches); What Is a Content ID Claim?, supra note 136. The 
agreement between YouTube and the copyright holder, however, may be unenforceable as they affect 
the content creator, a third-party not part of the agreement. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 80, at 307 
(discussing YouTube’s potential liability regarding the advertisement agreements between it and cop-
yright holders). 
 138 See Cecilia Kang, YouTube to Pay Fees for Some Video Makers to Fight Takedowns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/technology/youtube-to-pay-fees-for-
some-video-makers-to-fight-takedowns.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/5RAC-P4FC] (explaining that on 
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sponsors the legal costs of certain content creators that are the targets of im-
proper takedown requests.139 Those content creators legally use copyrighted 
material under the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.140 
YouTube explained that its goal is to protect free speech as well as strengthen 
its ties with its content creators.141 
B. The Lenz Take on Computer Algorithm Systems 
In March 2016, the Ninth Circuit released an amended opinion in Lenz, no 
longer discussing the effects of its holding on computer algorithm systems.142 
The fact that the court redacted language hinting that computer algorithms are 
capable of sufficiently considering fair use suggests that computer algorithms 
may in fact not be safe under its holding.143 In its pre-amended opinion, the 
court, in dicta, commented on how its holding could impact the use of computer 
algorithm systems.144 The court held that the DMCA’s takedown procedures re-
quire an entity to consider fair use, yet the court further explained that the for-
mation of a good faith belief does not require extensive investigation of the al-
leged infringing content.145  
The court explained that the use of computer algorithms may sufficiently 
consider fair use if they automatically identify content where “(1) the video track 
matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner; (2) 
the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and (3) 
                                                                                                                           
November 19, 2015, YouTube announced its new program that aims to offer more legal protection to 
its content creators by agreeing to pay for attorney fees).  
 139 See id.; see also Amul Kalia, YouTube Backs Its Users with New Fair Use Protection Pro-
gram, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/11/
youtube-backs-its-users-new-fair-use-protection-program [https://perma.cc/EX25-CLWS] (discussing 
the details of YouTube’s new fair use protection program); von Lohmann, supra note 2 (explaining 
the details of YouTube’s fair use program). 
 140 von Lohmann, supra note 2. YouTube identifies eligible creators as those that use copyrighted 
material in the form of commentary, criticism, news or parody—otherwise known as fair use. Id.; see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors that must be considered in a fair use analysis). An 
example of a channel that YouTube has agreed to defend is one dedicated to revealing the truth behind 
unidentified flying objects. Kang, supra note 138. As of November 19, 2015, that channel had re-
ceived three takedown requests. Id. The owner of the channel stated: “It was very gratifying to know 
[YouTube] cares about fair use and to single out someone like me.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 141 von Lohmann, supra note 2. 
 142 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz III), 815 F.3d 1145, 1145–61 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 143 See id. 
 144 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz II), 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.), amended by 815 
F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating “without passing judgment, that the implementation of computer 
algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for processing a plethora of content while 
still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use”). 
 145 See id. (“[I]n the majority of cases, a consideration of fair use prior to issuing a takedown 
notice will not be so complicated as to jeopardize a copyright owner’s ability to respond rapidly to 
potential infringements . . . .” (quoting Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz I), 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 
1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008))). 
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nearly the entirety . . . is comprised of a single copyrighted work.”146 The court, 
however, did note that copyright holders could then employ individuals to re-
view the “minimal remaining content” a computer algorithm does not cover; 
suggesting that human review is still necessary for a fair use analysis.147 
III. A PARALLEL UNIVERSE: YOUTUBE’S CONTENT ID  
VERSUS THE DMCA 
To monitor infringing content, YouTube now employs two different sys-
tems.148 First, it still engages in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(“DMCA”) formal takedown process where it promptly removes or blocks in-
fringing videos once it receives a formal takedown notice from copyright hold-
ers.149 Content creators whose material is targeted through the formal takedown 
process benefit from the ability to file a counter notice and a misrepresentation 
suit against those who filed a wrongful takedown notice.150 Second, YouTube 
employs its own computer-automated system, Content ID, that notifies copyright 
holders of potential infringing content.151 Content creators whose material Con-
tent ID identifies as possibly infringing, however, do not have the benefit of fil-
ing a counter notification or misrepresentation claim.152 
Despite the overlap between Content ID’s effects and those of the formal 
takedown process, in removing and blocking videos, Content ID operates wholly 
outside the DMCA and judicial review.153 To bridge the gap between the two 
copyright policing forces, some of the limitations placed on formal takedowns 
should also apply to Content ID.154 Specifically, Content ID’s inability to con-
                                                                                                                           
 146 Id. (quoting Brief for the Org. for Transformative Works, Public Knowledge & Int’l Docu-
mentary Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 29–30 n.8). But see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (outlining 
the four factor analysis to determine whether an activity is fair use). 
 147 See Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1136. 
 148 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (g)(3) (2012) (describing the 
requirements of a misrepresentation suit and a counter notice). 
 151 How Content ID Works, supra note 2. 
 152 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (g)(3) (describing the requirements of a misrepresentation suit and a 
counter notice). 
 153 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (describing the takedown procedures); Simon, supra note 80, at 323 
(noting that Content ID exists outside of federal copyright law); How Content ID Works, supra note 2 
(explaining how a content creator can contest a Content ID match and omit filing a misrepresentation 
claim in federal court). 
 154 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)–(g); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz III), 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a fair use analysis is required prior to issuing a takedown notice); Simon, 
supra note 80, at 323 (noting that Content ID exists outside of federal copyright law). 
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sider fair use should prohibit YouTube from safe harbor status, exposing it to 
liability for misrepresentation under § 512(f) of the DMCA.155 
Content ID disrupts the Internet community by blocking or removing law-
ful videos without giving content creators the same bundle of rights that they 
otherwise have under the DMCA—most importantly, the right to file a misrepre-
sentation claim.156 In reality, YouTube knows that Content ID is incapable of 
considering fair use and thus misrepresenting that it has a good faith belief that 
the video is not authorized by the law.157 Even though a Content ID match is not 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1145–61 (omitting reference to computer algorithms capability of 
considering fair use); 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (outlining the requirements for safe harbor status). Section 
512(f) states that 
any person who knowingly materially misrepresents . . . (1) that material or activity is 
infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages . . . incurred by the alleged infringer . . . 
as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or 
disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the 
removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(f); see also Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom II), 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2nd Cir. 
2012) (holding that YouTube is disqualified from its safe harbor under the DMCA if it has actual 
knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that indicated specific and identifiable instances of 
infringement). Content ID compares a video to its reference files on audio grounds, video grounds, 
partial comparison, and even when one video’s quality is worse than another. How Content ID Works, 
supra note 2. If Content ID identifies a material as potentially infringing, the video may be removed 
or blocked if the copyright holder has contracted with Content ID to do so. Id. Thus, Content ID’s 
system is not a proper fair use analysis under the Copyright Act of 1976. See Copyright Act of 1976, 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (enumerating the fair use factors). Moreover, it is highly doubtful that com-
puter algorithm systems are capable of conducting a proper fair use analysis due to the fact intensive 
nature of such an analysis. See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1145–61 (omitting mention of computer algo-
rithms’ capability of conducting a fair use analysis). 
 156 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that an entity must consider four factors when determining 
whether a video is fair use); Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding that an entity is required to consider 
fair use before issuing a takedown notice under § 512(c), and that an entity’s failure to do so makes 
them liable under § 512(f)); How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining that Content ID com-
pares a video to its reference files on audio grounds, video grounds, partial comparison, and even 
when one video’s quality is worse than another). Section 107 provides: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such find-
ing is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C. § 107; id. § 512(f) (allowing parties to file a misrepresentation claim for false or fraudulent 
takedown notices). 
 157 See, e.g., Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding that an entity must consider fair use before issu-
ing a takedown notice under § 512(c), and that an entity’s failure to do so makes them liable under 
§ 512(f)); How Content ID Works, supra note 2. Content ID is thus not properly analyzing fair use 
1868 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1847 
a formal takedown request under § 512(c)(3), it should nonetheless trigger liabil-
ity and exempt YouTube from safe harbor status because it effectively stifles 
speech in the same way that a formal takedown request does.158 
This Part suggests two recommendations that would help restore a balance 
between service providers, copyright holders, and content creators.159 Section A 
argues that computer algorithm systems, including Content ID, cannot sufficient-
ly consider fair use to escape liability for misrepresentation under § 512(f).160 
Section B recommends what a proper fair use consideration should entail to es-
cape misrepresentation liability.161 Section C argues that internal computer algo-
rithm systems should be required to consider fair use, in the same manner that 
third-party computer algorithm systems are required to do, in order to receive 
safe harbor status under the DMCA.162 
A. Computer Algorithm Systems Cannot Sufficiently Consider Fair Use to 
Escape Liability for Misrepresentation Under § 512(f) 
Surprisingly, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Lenz 
v. Universal Music Corp., in 2015, amended its opinion, in dicta, it commented 
on computer algorithm systems, a factual issue not present in the case, and sug-
gested that they could sufficiently consider fair use.163 Although the court ulti-
mately suggested that copyright holders could employ individuals to review the 
“minimal remaining content” a computer program does not catch, it is unclear 
what a sufficient fair use consideration under the takedown procedures entails.164 
The court explained that computer programs automatically issue takedown 
notices after reviewing content where: “(1) the video track matches the video 
                                                                                                                           
because it is simply flagging similar videos or videos that contain snippets of another, without consid-
ering the content and purpose of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four fair use factors); 
How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how Content ID makes a match according to key-
words and phrases). 
 158 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (stating that “any person who knowingly materially misrepresents . . . 
that material or activity is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages . . .”). Compare How Content 
ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how Content ID can have a video blocked or removed even before 
the copyright holder decides to issue a formal takedown request), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (outlin-
ing the elements of a formal takedown request that includes “a statement that the complaining party 
has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law”). 
 159 See infra notes 184–198 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra notes 176–183 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 184–198 and accompanying text. 
 163 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz II), 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.), amended by 815 
F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that the use of computer algorithm systems is a proper balance 
between policing information and complying with the requirements under the DMCA to consider fair 
use). 
 164 See id. (stating three factors that computer programs could identify for automatic takedown 
requests). 
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track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner; (2) the audio track 
matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entire-
ty . . . is comprised of a single copyrighted work” could meet the fair use analy-
sis requirement under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).165 The court also noted that an individ-
ual could then review the “minimal remaining content that the computer pro-
gram does not cover.”166 The court, however, also cited the four factors that a 
fair use analysis must consider under § 107, but notably, those four factors do 
not match the three previously suggested by the court.167 Thus, it is unclear if 
the court was referring to its own three factors as a sufficient fair use analysis 
under § 107 (which would violate § 107), or if it was referring to the fair use 
analysis under § 107 as the “minimal remaining content a computer program 
does not cover.”168 In either case, the court seems to have over-simplified the 
requirements of a proper fair use consideration.169 
In the pre-amended Lenz opinion, in his partial dissent, Judge Smith also 
questioned the majority’s suggestion that computer algorithm systems can 
properly consider a fair use analysis.170 He cautioned that although those pro-
grams may be useful in detecting infringing content, an individual relying solely 
on that program can do so only to the extent that the program considers the four 
factors enumerated in § 107.171 Similarly, other scholars have questioned wheth-
er computer algorithm systems can properly conduct a fair use analysis.172 
Companies that rely solely on computer algorithm systems that automati-
cally issue takedown requests can find themselves violating the takedown notice 
requirements for failure to properly consider fair use.173 A takedown notice must 
contain “[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use 
of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by . . . the law[,]” 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 1136. 
 167 See id. at 1132, 1135 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 and describing three factors that computer algorithm 
systems should identify prior to issuing a takedown notice, including video and audio matching as well as 
substantial copying of an entire work). 
 168 See id. at 1135–36. 
 169 See id. at 1135; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors that must be considered 
in a fair use analysis); Boroughf, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing the problems associated with auto-
mated computer systems like Content ID, such as the lack of human involvement); Pamela Samuel-
son, Unbundling Fair Use, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009) (noting that fair use is a fact-
intensive inquiry done on a case-by-case basis). 
 170 See Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1141 n.3 (stating that the record does not disclose whether computer 
algorithm systems can currently analyze fair use). 
 171 See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors that must be considered in a 
fair use analysis). 
 172 See, e.g., Boroughf, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing the problems associated with automated 
computer systems like Content ID, such as the lack of human involvement); Samuelson, supra note 
169, at 2540 (noting that fair use is a fact-intensive inquiry done on a case-by-case basis). 
 173 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding that copyright holders must consider fair use before 
issuing a takedown request). 
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thus as fair use is authorized by law, a complaining party must consider fair 
use.174 Thus, parties that rely exclusively on computer algorithm systems inca-
pable of considering fair use are violating § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) and can therefore be 
held liable under § 512(f) for misrepresentation.175 
B. What a Fair Use Consideration Should Entail to Escape 
Misrepresentation Liability 
In both the pre-amended opinion and the amended opinion, the Lenz court 
failed to explain what encompasses a proper fair use analysis.176 Although the 
doctrine of fair use is a flexible and factually intensive analysis, there are well-
established factors and certain guiding principles that courts should adhere to 
when determining whether a computer algorithm system properly considered 
fair use to escape misrepresentation liability.177 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 enumerates four factors that must 
be considered in a fair use analysis.178 Because courts rely on these factors when 
deciding whether a material is fair use, computer algorithm systems should also 
consider the four factors prior to issuing a takedown notice.179 Requiring all enti-
ties to adhere to the four factors of a fair use analysis allows for consistency 
across various sectors and potentially cuts down on judicial administrative costs 
as it could save courts valuable time when conducting a fair use analysis.180 
Thus, although computer algorithm systems could begin identifying potentially 
infringing works using a red flag method like the one suggested in Lenz, an 
                                                                                                                           
 174 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151. 
 175 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (outlining the requirements for a takedown notice); id. § 512(f) 
(stating that any individual can be held liable for misrepresenting that a material or activity is infring-
ing); Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding that a party must consider fair use prior to issuing a 
takedown request). 
 176 Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151–54 (noting that fair use must be considered but failing to explain 
what that consideration entails); Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1135–36 (holding that fair use must be consid-
ered but failing to address how to conduct that analysis). 
 177 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors that must be considered in fair use); Samu-
elson, supra note 169, at 2542 (explaining that a fair use analysis goes beyond the four statutory fac-
tors as courts rely heavily on the policies underlying fair use, including “promoting freedom of speech 
and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to information, truth telling or 
truth seeking, competition, technological innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users”). 
 178 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors that must be considered in fair use). 
 179 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1152; see also Samuelson, supra note 169, at 2542 (suggesting that a 
proper fair use analysis, in addition to the four statutory factors, also reviews policy-relevant issues). 
Content ID, however, does not consider the four statutory factors, nor does it consider policy-relevant 
issues. See How Content ID Works, supra note 2. 
 180 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Samuelson, supra note 169, at 2543 (recognizing that a clear and con-
sistent fair use analysis provides courts with a more effective tool). Moreover, Content ID currently 
exists outside of federal law and requiring it to properly conduct a fair use analysis would bring uni-
formity. See How Content ID Works, supra note 2. 
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analysis applying the four fair use factors should be required prior to sending a 
takedown notice.181 
In addition, courts place emphasis on policy arguments when determining 
whether a work is fair use, and thus agents of computer algorithm systems 
should consider strong policy arguments that favor a fair use finding before en-
gaging in the takedown procedures.182 Due to the factually intensive nature of 
the fair use analysis and courts’ heavy reliance on policy, computer algorithm 
systems could use red flag provisions to detect possibly infringing work, but will 
need to rely on human oversight to properly consider fair use to escape misrep-
resentation liability.183 
C. Restoring the Balance Among YouTube, Copyright Holders, and Content 
Creators: Adding Fair Use to Safe Harbor Requirements 
Despite the fact that YouTube issues Content ID matches that result in law-
ful videos being removed or blocked, it escapes liability under the DMCA.184 
Generally, YouTube maintains its safe harbor as long as it does not have actual 
knowledge that material on its site is infringing, does not receive financial bene-
fit directly attributable to the infringing activity where it has control over the 
material, and removes the material quickly after being informed of its exist-
ence.185 In addition, YouTube must have a designated agent to receive notifica-
tions of alleged infringement.186 Other third-party automated systems, however, 
are not so lucky and do face liability for failure to comply with the DMCA; no-
                                                                                                                           
 181 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four fair use factors); Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1135 (describ-
ing a red flag-like provision where computer algorithm systems could police for three situations: 
where “(1) the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner; 
(2) the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . 
is comprised of a single copyrighted work”). 
 182 See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a Beanie 
Babies collector’s guide that commented on the plush toys was fair use because granting author’s 
exclusive rights over critical commentary would hinder the dissemination of public knowledge); Cas-
tle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a fair 
use analysis that rigidly applies the four statutory factors would be at odds with the goals of the Copy-
right Act); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (hold-
ing that a fair use analysis determines whether science and the arts are better promoted by allowing or 
preventing the use); Samuelson, supra note 169, at 2542 (explaining that a fair use analysis goes be-
yond the four statutory factors as courts rely heavily on the policies underlying fair use). 
 183 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating the four factors to a fair use analysis, which rely on doing a 
factually intensive analysis); Samuelson, supra note 169, at 2542 (emphasizing the fact intensive 
nature of a fair use analysis). 
 184 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (outlining the requirements by which YouTube must abide in order to 
maintain its safe harbor status). 
 185 See id. (explaining how an ISP escapes liability). 
 186 See § 512(c)(2) (outlining the requirements of a designated agent). 
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tably if they fail to consider fair use before sending a takedown notice.187 Thus, 
this begs the question: why would copyright holders and websites like YouTube 
not collaborate to utilize YouTube’s own internal automated system to police 
infringing content?188 
In the context of YouTube, that concern is even greater because YouTube 
exerts near-monopoly power over the video uploading market.189 The rise of 
Content ID demonstrates a new shift in the Internet community where copyright 
holders and platforms like YouTube are encouraged to work with each other.190 
Although this collaboration has helped music sales and video sales grow, it has 
come at the expense of content creators.191 Congress, therefore, should restore 
the balance between copyright holders, ISPs, and content creators by requiring 
websites that utilize an internal policing system to consider fair use before issu-
ing the equivalent of a takedown notice—in YouTube’s case a Content ID 
match.192 
In the current regime, content creators that upload videos to YouTube waive 
the majority of their rights as YouTube has the final say on what material is ulti-
mately displayed on its website.193 Although YouTube presents content creators 
with an opportunity to appeal a Content ID match, that opportunity is not viable 
for many content creators because the process is lengthy and many videos are 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See id. § 512(f) (designating liability for misrepresenting an infringement claim); Lenz III, 815 
F.3d at 1151 (holding Universal’s automated system liable for misrepresentation if they fail to consid-
er fair use before sending a takedown request). 
 188 See How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how Content ID works and how copy-
right holders are now joining YouTube’s index system). Copyright holders are incentivized to use 
Content ID’s system because it requires less policing on their part and allows them to block, remove, 
or monetize a video without having to file a formal takedown notice and risk the filing of a counter 
notice or misrepresentation lawsuit. See id. 
 189 See Boroughf, supra note 1, at 101 (discussing YouTube’s prominent role in society as a place 
of empowerment, creativity, publication and everyday conversation). 
 190 See How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining how Content ID works and how copy-
right holders are now joining YouTube’s index system). In the past, however, copyright holders were 
zealously advocating to shut down websites like YouTube for alleged copyright infringement. See 
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom I), 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (bringing 
suit against YouTube alleging that it hosted infringing content). 
 191 See Boroughf, supra note 1, at 97 (discussing how Content ID’s structure has a potential to 
chill speech and take advantage of the creativity and work of content creators); Leister, supra note 6, 
at 109 (noting that modern copyright law is in danger because of YouTube’s monopoly over video 
sharing platforms and their ability to escape liability, the lack of congressional regulation, a content 
creator’s fear of suit, and copyright holders’ power of the purse). 
 192 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (outlining the requirements that YouTube must abide by in order to 
keep its safe harbor status); Lenz II, 801 F.3d at 1135 (holding that a party must consider fair use prior 
to issuing a takedown request); Leister, supra note 6, at 109 (noting the lack of legislative regulation). 
 193 See Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/t/terms [https://perma.cc/7WVP-
6EWX] (explaining in its account termination policy that YouTube has final say on what content goes 
up on its website). 
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time-sensitive.194 Thus, Congress should amend the DMCA to add a fair use re-
quirement for ISPs like YouTube to continue receiving its safe harbor status.195 
The provision could, for example, require that ISPs conducting their own 
internal policing consider fair use before removing or blocking a video.196 The 
proposed requirement would thus help restore the balance between copyright 
holders, ISPs, and content creators, as content creators would gain more protec-
tion over their videos.197 The requirement is reasonably tailored to avoid placing 
additional burdens on ISPs because it does not require ISPs to conduct their own 
internal policing; rather it mandates that they comply with the consideration of 
fair use if they do.198 
CONCLUSION 
As computer automated systems searching for copyright infringement on 
the Internet become more popular, a greater risk to the Internet community is 
posed as more material is incorrectly flagged and then removed or blocked. 
Those abused by overzealous takedowns have little to no redress when these 
actions are initiated by private websites monitoring their own systems. The 
DMCA sought to address concerns about chilling speech, promoting creativity, 
and encouraging fair use by balancing the bundle of rights held by copyright 
holders, ISPs, and content creators. Copyright holders were granted the swift 
removal of alleged infringing content through the takedown procedures, ISPs 
like YouTube were granted safe harbor as long as they complied with those min-
imal procedures, and content creators were granted the right to combat abuse 
through the misrepresentation provision of the DMCA. With websites policing 
their own systems, however, the balance of rights is distorted. Copyright holders 
still benefit from swift removal, websites like YouTube still benefit from safe 
harbors, yet content creators and society lose from the lack of creative and fair 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See How Content ID Works, supra note 2 (explaining the appeal process for a Content ID 
match); Declan McCullagh, McCain Campaign Protests YouTube’s DMCA Policy, CNET (Oct. 27, 
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videos). 
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keep its safe harbor status); Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding a party must consider fair use prior to 
issuing a takedown request); Leister, supra note 6, at 109 (noting the need for more legislative regula-
tion). 
 196 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (outlining the requirements that YouTube must abide by in order to 
keep its safe harbor status); Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1151 (holding that a party must consider fair use 
prior to issuing a takedown request); See Leister, supra note 6, at 109 (stating the need for more regu-
lation). 
 197 See Eakman, supra note 22, at 635 (noting that the DMCA attempted to strike a balance be-
tween the rights of copyright holders and the rights of those that upload to the Internet). 
 198 See Lenz III, 815 F.3d at 1157–58 (explaining that requiring a fair use analysis is necessary to 
secure the free exchange of ideas on the Internet). 
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use material. To decrease the volume of lawful videos that are removed or 
blocked, computer algorithm systems should be required to consider fair use by 
invoking human review back into the system. Additionally, ISPs that conduct 
internal policing systems should also be required to consider fair use to maintain 
their safe harbor status. 
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